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The impact of a premium based tick size on equity option liquidity 
 
 
Abstract: On June 2, 2009, NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam reduced the tick size for options 
trading at prices below €0.20 from €0.05 to €0.01 and on April 1, 2010, the exchange 
increased the price threshold to €0.50. We study the effect of that tick size reduction on the 
liquidity of individual equity options. In this respect, this study is uniquely positioned in the 
options context where moneyness is a clear additional factor in the implementation of the tick 
size changes. We show that, in general, quoted and traded option liquidity increased but at a 
rate decreasing with option moneyness. Real costs have fallen more for the lower priced 
contracts. Importantly, we show that the ability of the market to absorb larger trades has 
diminished after the change in the tick size. We document a substantial increase in quote 
revisions that implies a deterioration in the order book, as it allows traders to take advantage 
of the price priority rule and step ahead of larger trades. Finally, the decrease in the tick size 
has led to increased speculative trading behaviour. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On June 2, 2009, NYSE LIFFE introduced the Premium Based Tick Size rule (henceforth 
PBTS) on all single stock options trading at NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam. According to the new 
rule, equity options trading at a premium of €0.20 or lower could be quoted at a tick size of 
€0.01, whereas options trading at prices higher than the threshold continued to be quoted at a 
minimum tick of €0.05. On April 1, 2010, NYSE LIFFE increased the price threshold from 
€0.20 to €0.50. This paper presents evidence on the effect of the implementation of the PBTS 
on the quote and trade liquidity of individual equity options. In this respect, this study is 
uniquely positioned in the options context where moneyness is a clear additional factor in the 
implementation of the tick size changes. 
Theoretically, Harris (1994) suggests that a decrease in tick size is expected to lead to a 
narrowing of spreads if the current tick size is  greater than the size that would be quoted if 
no minimum tick was enforced. Most importantly, spreads are expected to narrow more for 
the lower priced assets for which the minimum tick size is a more binding constraint. Also, to 
the extent that there is a negative association between trading volume and spreads, the 
reduction in tick size would increase trading volume. Meanwhile, market depth is expected to 
decrease. This is because traders desiring trade large sizes may be deterred since the small 
tick size increases the probability that other smaller traders may step ahead of them in the 
order book. On this latter point, Portniaguina et al. (2006) show that in hybrid markets like 
the NYSE, a reduction in tick size reduces the value of a limit order which may lead to the 
order book becoming very thin and quoted spreads becoming very wide as a consequence. 
The authors show that a decrease in the minimum tick size increases the cost of submitting 
large orders and subsequently leads to order splitting (stealth trading). However, the effect of 
this change on specialist participation rates is not expected to be uniform. For stocks with a 
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smaller initial average trade size, order splitting should not be as prevalent as for firms with 
large initial trade sizes. Portniaguina et al. (2006) show that market maker profits will be 
positive for the former stocks and less positive, or possibly negative, for the latter. 
Empirically, in equity and futures markets, several studies have shown that a reduction in tick 
size delivers two main outcomes. First, spreads generally narrow (see Harris, 1991, 1994; 
Seppi, 1997; Bollen et al., 1998; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000; Jones and Lipson, 2001; 
Bessembinder, 2003; Smith et al., 2005). Second, market depth deteriorates as a smaller tick 
size makes front running more profitable for smaller investors and increases order 
transparency for large traders (see Harris, 1996; Angel, 1997; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000; 
Jones and Lipson, 2001). The latter implies an overall increase in liquidity for small trades 
and an overall decrease for institutional trades. Also, Bourghellea and Declerck (2004) show 
that a tick size change is not necessarily associated with a change in liquidity supply but 
primarily affects order submission strategies. This is due to the fact that a decrease in the tick 
size fails to attract liquidity providers on the limit order book and, if the spread remains 
unaffected, depth generally still reduces. 
From the empirical perspective, the issue is far from being resolved in favour of smaller tick 
sizes. In 2001, NASDAQ and NYSE replaced the fractional price system with decimal prices, 
cutting the tick size to one cent for both markets. However, in June 2013, the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission has been reported to draft a pilot program that would increase the 
tick size for 100 of the smaller or less liquid US stocks (see Mamudi and Michaels, 2013). 
This has been in response to criticisms from the financial industry that “decimalization — a 
euphemism for the collapse in trading spreads, tick sizes and commissions — decimated the 
U.S. IPO market” (Weild et al., 2012, p. 2).  In their view, it is crucial to provide economic 
incentives to market makers in order to continue supporting small stocks and provide analyst 
coverage. In this respect, our study is extremely timely. Also, for NYSE LIFFE, market 
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makers are an integral part of the trading process as, under their contractual obligations with 
the exchange, they are obliged to offer competitive two-way quotes across the whole 
spectrum of contracts that are trading at the exchange. In this respect, the implementation of 
the PBTS may lead to lower profits for market makers which may serve as a disincentive to 
offer competitive quotes. On the other hand, Harris (1994) suggests that since market maker 
profits are a function of volume and spreads, their profits would overall increase if volume 
increases by more than the decrease in spreads. However, Al-Yahyaee (2013) shows that a 
decrease in tick size does not always lead to increases in trading volume. 
Liquidity has multiple dimensions, namely spread, depth and execution speed. Spread refers 
to the round-trip cost of trading, depth measures the supply of liquidity and execution speed 
refers to how quickly orders are filled. As we don’t have information on how long limit 
orders remain in the order book, we capture the latter dimension by measuring quote 
revisions, that is the percentage of quote updates at a given interval. The assumption is that an 
increase in quote revisions implies greater costs for market participants. We also provide 
evidence on two hybrid measures of liquidity that combine spread and depth, namely quoted 
slope (see Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001), which we refer to as quote liquidity, and effective 
spread, which we refer to as trade liquidity.
1
 
Our findings suggest that while spread liquidity generally increased more for the deep-out-of-
the-money options, depth liquidity deteriorated more for contracts that are further in-the-
money. This implies that, following the tick size changes, quoted liquidity generally 
increased for the deep-out-of-the-money (DOTM) and the out-of-the-money (OTM) 
contracts, but at a decreasing rate for greater moneyness. Similarly, effective spreads 
decreased more than quoted spread for contracts with low moneyness but the significance 
                                                          
1
 Section 4 discusses why we use effective spreads and quote slope as hybrid measures of trade and quote 
liquidity respectively.   
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disappears as moneyness increases. For calls priced under €0.20, this drop in effective 
spreads is due to an overall decrease in real costs net of the price impact of trades. For 
contracts priced between €0.20 and €0.50, the decrease in spreads is due to a decrease in 
price impact rather than a decrease in real costs. 
Importantly, we show that the ability of the market to absorb larger trades has diminished 
after the tick size change. However, as 60% of trades are retail (see Noiville and Seblain, 
2011), we expect that this decrease in liquidity has no effect for the vast majority of traders in 
the market. Consistent with previous findings, trading activity generally increased after the 
tick size changes, also implying an increase in riskier trading activities. We document an 
increase in the volatility for the DOTM puts that is consistent with the hypothesized increase 
in the speculative behaviour for these contracts.  Finally, we document a substantial increase 
in quote revisions. This finding shows strong support for the hypothesis that the decrease in 
tick size has potentially led to deterioration of the order book, as it allows traders to take 
advantage of the price priority rule and step ahead of larger trades. 
Our findings have important implications for optimal contract design in the equity options 
market. The goal of attracting liquidity has been achieved with two immediate implications: 
economic rents have been transferred from market makers to individual investors and the 
increase in liquidity has been realized at the expense of a thinner market for larger investors. 
The price/time priority rule may not work in circumstances when a large trade enters the 
market and, in such occasions, market makers should be allowed to increase their economic 
rents for facilitating abnormal trade sizes in ways similar to an upstairs market. A second 
possible scenario would be for the exchange to introduce a pro-rata algorithm that will 
circumvent the problem with the price priority rule when the tick size is too small. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the market structure. 
Section 3 discusses the positioning of the paper and outlines the testable hypotheses. Section 
4 describes the data and research design issues, Section 5 presents the analysis and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. NYSE LIFFE AMSTERDAM MARKET STRUCTURE 
NYSE LIFFE is the derivatives branch of NYSE for the European derivatives market, 
overseeing a total of five European markets (Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, London and 
Paris). Trading on NYSE LIFFE takes place via LIFFE CONNECT, an anonymous, 
electronic order-driven system, and liquidity is supported by the “Euronext Liquidity 
Provider System” (ELPS). ELPS operates on the basis of market makers acting as liquidity 
providers with the obligation to submit continuous asks and bids in near-the-money contracts 
and receive trading rebates as a return.
2
  
NYSE LIFFE implemented the new tick size for all options trading below €0.20 with 
effective date June 2, 2009. The exchange stated that the “PBTS is designed to have the tick 
size match the level of the premium: a small tick size for lower prices and a large tick size for 
higher prices”. Further, the exchange added that since the introduction of the new tick size, 
spreads have almost halved for the affected contracts (see PBTS, 2013). 
The implementation of the PBTS rule on NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam is unique from several 
perspectives. First, trading at NYSE LIFFE is facilitated by a liquidity provider scheme, the 
“Euronext Liquidity Provider System” (ELPS). For Amsterdam, the exchange recognizes 
three types of liquidity providers, the Primary Market Makers (PMMs), the Competitive 
                                                          
2
 “How the Euronext.liffe markets work”. Available on the NYSE LIFFE website. 
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Market Makers (CMMs) and the Extra Competitive Market Makers (CMXs). Market makers’ 
spread and size obligations are a function of the price and volatility of the underlying asset 
(updated semi-annually) and refer to maximum spread and minimum size (e.g. a maximum 
spread of 50p and a minimum size of 10 contracts). Spread and size obligations are therefore 
not uniform across all assets. All market makers are required to trade a minimum number of 
contracts of high liquidity assets.
3
 Trading fee reductions are not uniform and are based on a 
monthly evaluation of the market maker’s performance. Second, an important feature of the 
ELPS in Amsterdam is that PMMs are obliged to offer two-way competitive quotes for the 
entire series of contacts for which they are contractually obligated to offer liquidity. This 
implies that PMMS are obliged to offer continuous quotes for at least 85% of the relevant 
number of series and during at least 85% of the specific time period. However, CMMs and 
CMXs are obliged to offer liquidity for the near-the-money contracts only. The above imply 
that the implementation of the PBTS affects PMMs’ quote obligations more than CMMs or 
CMXs, as the PBTS is mostly relevant for the OTM options that are priced at lower levels 
than the remaining options. With respect to market makers’ willingness to offer competitive 
quotes at a smaller tick size, Harris (1994) shows that when tick size decreases, market 
makers may have a smaller incentive to submit quotes that are binding when it is relatively 
cheap to obtain price priority at a market with a smaller tick size. Third, NYSE LIFFE 
Amsterdam is heavily dominated by retail investors (see Noiville and Seblain, 2011) and 
concerns have been raised regarding the potential impact of PBTS on boosting the trading 
activity for the OTM options, arguing that trading OTM options will remain too costly as 
brokerage retail fees are high, taking away any savings from trading at a smaller fee (Fooling 
retail investors with new tick size, 2009).  
 
                                                          
3
 Asset liquidity and hence the number of market makers for each asset is assessed and defined by the exchange. 
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3. HYPOTHESES 
The implementation of the PBTS is expected to have an effect on three features of trading in 
equity options: liquidity, trading activity and volatility. In Section 1, we outlined the main 
measures of liquidity: quoted spread, depth and execution speed. In the section below, we 
develop the hypotheses with regard to each measure and also with regard to the anticipated 
effects of the PBTS on trading activity and volatility.  
While the evidence from literature on the effect of tick size reductions on asset liquidity is 
overwhelmingly positive for the spread aspect of liquidity, deteriorations in depth may lead to 
an overall increase in transaction costs for larger trades. There is a large number of studies 
that report narrower spreads following a tick size reduction (see Harris, 1991 and 1994; 
Seppi, 1997; Bollen et al., 1998; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000; Jones and Lipson, 2001; 
Bessembinder, 2003; Smith et al., 2005), however Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) and Jones 
and Lipson (2001) report a decrease in depth for NYSE stocks after decimalisation. Also, for 
the UK Long Gilt futures market, ap Gwilym et al (2005) show that while depth decreased 
following a move to decimal pricing, the spread, measured in ticks, increased but the 
monetary value of the spread decreased. With regard to effective spreads as a hybrid measure 
of liquidity, Bessembinder (2003) reports that effective spreads have generally declined for 
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks after decimalisation and that small capitalisation stocks 
benefitted most from the reduction in tick size. No studies exist on the quote slope as a hybrid 
measure of quote liquidity, nevertheless, we anticipate a reduction in quote slope if overall 
liquidity has increased. We thus derive the following hypotheses:  
Contracts that trade under a smaller tick size will: 
Hypothesis 1: Exhibit a decrease in quoted spreads 
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Hypothesis 2: Exhibit a decrease in depth 
Hypothesis 3: Exhibit an increase in trade and quote liquidity if the benefit from a reduction 
in the cost side of liquidity is greater than the cost of a decrease in liquidity supply 
Effective spreads can be further decomposed to two components: the price impact, which 
measures losses of investors to informed traders, and the realized spread which measures the 
post-trade price reversal or equally the cost of providing liquidity net of losses to informed 
traders (see Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997). If the smaller tick reduces spreads, both the 
price impact and the realized spread measures will fall as a consequence. In practice, this 
implies that there should be smaller price jumps in either direction with the smaller tick size. 
Most important, however, is the relative change of realized spreads to price impact. Realized 
spreads measure market making profits and, hence, a greater reduction in realized spreads as 
compared to price impact would imply that the hypothesized decrease in traded liquidity is 
more a function of a drop in real costs. We derive the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4: Price impact and realized spreads will be smaller for contracts that trade 
under the new tick size  
Harris (1994) shows that trading volume will increase following a decrease in tick size. Also, 
transaction frequency may increase as it is cheaper to trade smaller sizes and reduce the cost 
of being a counterparty to informed traders. Bacidore (1997) reports that trading volume did 
not significantly increase at the Toronto Stock Exchange following the reduction of tick size. 
The same finding is reported for AMEX (see Ahn et al., 1996). On the other hand, following 
the increase of the tick size for the S&P500 futures contract trading at CME, Bollen et al. 
(2003) show an overall widening in spreads and a significant reduction in trading volume. 
Finally, Chakravarty et al. (2003) has shown that while trading volume and the number of 
trades increased for small NYSE stocks following decimalisation, there was a significant 
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decrease in trading activity for large size trades. Harris (1994) also predicts that a reduction in 
tick size will have more visible effects on the trade liquidity of the more heavily traded 
stocks, because it is more likely that the previous larger tick size acted as a binding constraint 
for a narrowing of spreads on these stocks. We subsequently derive the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 5: Contracts that trade under a smaller tick size will exhibit an overall increase 
in trading activity 
Hypothesis 6: Trade liquidity will increase more for assets that are more heavily traded 
An important aspect of the implementation of the PBTS is that it is expected to have an 
asymmetric effect on option contracts based on the moneyness of those contracts. In 
particular, PBTS is aligned to the option price and as a result the effect should be stronger for 
the OTM options, since these are the options that are the lowest priced across moneyness. 
PBTS is also expected to have a stronger positive effect for the OTM contracts that are more 
likely to expire in-the-money (ITM). The probability of exercise is negatively related to 
moneyness, with deeper OTM options being less likely to be exercised at maturity, i.e. to 
expire ITM, ceteris paribus. In addition, the probability of exercise at maturity for OTM 
options with the same moneyness is positively related to the underlying asset’s volatility. For 
instance, the price of a more volatile underlying asset is more likely to exceed at maturity the 
high strike price of a currently OTM call, compared to an equally OTM call written on an 
underlying asset with lower volatility. A similar argument applies in the case of OTM puts, 
where the prices of more volatile underlying assets are more likely at maturity to fall below 
the low strike prices of currently OTM puts.  
Overall, we hypothesize that as OTM options written on more volatile underlying assets have 
a higher probability of being ITM at expiration, the impact of the tick size change will be 
greater. Intuitively, we would expect traders to find these contracts more attractive for 
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speculative activities due to their higher probability of exercise at expiration, compared to 
equally OTM options written on less volatile assets. Consequently, a large tick size would 
constitute a greater constraint on trading these contracts with higher underlying volatility, and 
we anticipate a greater impact on their liquidity following a reduction of the tick size. In 
relation to the above, previous research suggests that if decreases in tick size are associated 
with lower liquidity then volatility should also increase (see Harris, 1994; Bessembinder, 
2003). Overall, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 7: Liquidity will increase by less as moneyness increases  
Hypothesis 8: The reduction in Spreads for OTM options written on more volatile underlying 
assets after the implementation of the PBTS will be greater compared to equally OTM 
contracts written on less volatile assets 
Hypothesis 9: Option spreads that are affected by the PBTS will exhibit lower volatility 
reflecting an overall increase in liquidity 
Finally, whilst it is not possible to measure execution speed directly, we assume that the latter 
is related to the percentage of quote revisions per time interval. In particular, the reduction in 
tick size is hypothesized to have a significant effect on quote revisions. More specifically, a 
smaller tick size reduces the cost of stepping ahead of other traders in the order book, and we 
hypothesize that quote revisions may significantly increase for those contracts that are 
affected by the implementation of the PBTS.  Hence, we assume that an increase in quote 
revisions implies greater costs for market participants. Bessembinder (2003) shows that 
neither NYSE nor NASDAQ exhibited any systematic increase in price reversals after the 
decrease in tick size: 
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Hypothesis 10: The number of quote revisions will increase for the contracts that are affected 
by the PBTS 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The intraday dataset contains information on maturity date, strike price, volume and price for 
all individual equity options (henceforth tickers), time-stamped to the nearest second, 
separately for asks, bids and trades.
 4
 Each ticker is trading under different contracts, which 
vary by the strike price, maturity date and contract type, i.e. call or put (henceforth sub-
tickers). We select options that expire within a maximum of 365 days, but not within seven 
days, since we want to avoid any very short term and very long term expiration effects. 
Moneyness is defined as S/K, where K refers to the option strike price and S to the 
underlying unadjusted opening price.
5
 For each contract type (call or put) we categorize sub-
tickers according to their moneyness level and days to expiration. For calls, we define DOTM 
contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness equal to 0.9 but 
smaller than 1.00 and in-the-money (ITM) contracts with moneyness between or equal to 
1.00 and 1.10. We drop contracts that are deep-in-the-money (moneyness > 1.10) as very few 
observations fall in this category. The opposite classification is used for puts. 
                                                          
4
 The number of tickers reflects the total number of firm-options trading at the exchanges and includes delisted 
options. 
5
 End-of-day prices for the underlying stocks are obtained from DataStream. We drop tickers for which we 
failed to identify their underlying instruments from DataStream. All options in the sample are American style. 
We drop the newly introduced weekly and daily options contracts. In total, 90 percent of contracts are 
maintained in the final sample. 
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We delete outliers based on spread and price criteria as follows. All zero volume, zero price 
and out-of-hours observations are deleted.
6
 Quotes with negative or zero bid-ask spreads are 
dropped from this sample. Also, as in Wei and Zheng (2010), we control for possible outlying 
data by dropping quotes with excessively large bid-ask spreads. The cut-off point for the 
percentage bid-ask spreads is set at 150% for the in-the-money options and 200% for the out-
of-the-money options.  
We focus on a 300-day window around the implementation of the PBTS rule and its 
subsequent update. The sample is split into four subsamples. The first refers to the days prior 
to the initial implementation of the PBTS (henceforth Stage 1) at a threshold price of €0.20 
(January 3, 2009 to June 1, 2009), the second to the dates after the implementation of the 
PBTS (June 2, 2009 to October 30, 2009). The third and fourth periods refer to the days 
before (November 2, 2009 to March 31, 2010) and after (April 1, 2010 to August 29, 2010) 
the increase of the price threshold to €0.50 (henceforth Stage 2).  
The estimation of quoted spreads, depths and option returns is based on sub-ticker mid-quotes 
which are calculated at 5 minute intervals from bid and ask prices as follows.  On each 
trading day, we select the first quote of the day, which is however quoted no later than 
8.01am. We then retain bid and ask quotes at five minute intervals, and we control for stale 
pricing by dropping bid and ask prices that are recorded more than two minutes prior to each 
five minute interval. For the closing return (16:30pm), a two-minute rule applies. We only 
estimate midquotes when both ask and bid prices are found within the aforementioned 
intervals. For the remaining intervals no midquotes are estimated. The above procedure 
                                                          
6
 All three exchanges are open between 08:00 and 16:30 (London time). We delete half-days. There are no zero-
volume trades in the raw dataset. However we include this restriction in any case in our sample, as the sample 
contains reported trades, hence all trades should contain a reported traded volume. The latter is an important 
distinction from datasets where market orders may contain zero volume (pre-reporting). 
14 
 
allows us to retain the maximum number of observations at regular time intervals, controlling 
at the same time for the biases of missing variables and stale pricing. In total there are 103 
intraday intervals per day, however we drop the opening and closing intervals, hence n 
denotes the total number of intervals (101) and i denotes each five-minute interval for each 
day t.  
The most commonly used spread measure is the quoted bid-ask spread, defined as the 
difference between the most recent ask and bid prices (see Petrella, 2006, Cao and Wei, 2010 
and Wei and Zheng, 2010). For each sub-ticker, we control for the price level differences by 
calculating the percentage bid-ask spread (PBASt), defined as the ratio of quoted spread over 
the quote midpoint:  
 
 
              
                 
      
 
(1) 
 
 
where Ask5-min and Bid5-min are the ask and bid prices sampled at 5-minute intervals, 
respectively, and M5-min is the trade midquote defined as half the sum of bid and ask prices at 
each interval. 
A reciprocal measure of liquidity is quoted depth (see Harris, 1990). We measure quoted 
depth (Depth) in number of contracts as follows: 
 
 
           
                               
 
 
(2) 
 
where Volumeask,5-min and Volumebid,5-min refer to the number of contracts quoted at the ask 
and bid prices, respectively. 
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A measure that combines the price information from the calculation of spreads and the 
quantity information from the calculation of depths is the Log Quote Slope that is defined as 
follows: 
 
                    
                      
   (               )                      
 
(3) 
 
The Log Quote Slope measures the slope of a line connecting the bid and ask price/quantity 
pairs (see Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001). Hence, liquidity will improve if either the size of ask 
or bid increases or if the spread decreases. The Effective Half Spread is used as a second 
measure of hybrid liquidity as, even though it does not contain a direct measure of quoted 
depth, it provides an ex-post estimate of the effect of a large trade in the best bid and ask. If, 
for example, a large trade has consumed more than one level of the limit order book, the 
effective spread will be worse than the quoted spread. The realized spread is a measure of 
transaction costs net of price impact. The latter is a measure of adverse selection costs. 
Trades are sampled at irregular intervals and for the calculation of effective spreads, we 
select the most recent bid and ask prices which are within five seconds to two minutes prior 
to each trade. For the calculation of price impacts, we use the five-minute midquotes that are 
within a four-minute to eight-minute time frame after each trade. 
We calculate effective spreads as follows (see Venkataraman, 2001):  
 
 
                 
                
         
 
(4) 
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Where D is a trade indicator dummy that takes the value of -1 if the trade is classified as a 
sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. We use the quote method to classify trades. For the 
trades that are not classified, we use the trade method. Less than one percent of trades are not 
identified with either method and are, hence, dropped from the sample. We calculate price 
impacts as follows: 
 
 
                    
                     
         
 
(5) 
 
Finally, we calculate realized spreads as follows: 
 
 
                  
                  
         
 
(6) 
 
Where Midquotet+1 refers to the midquote recorded within a four-minute to eight-minute time 
frame after each trade. 
Logarithmic intraday returns (r) are calculated on midquote prices at a sub-ticker level. 
However, while dropping observations with excessively large spreads may alleviate the 
problem of outlying data for spreads, the problem still remains for the calculation of returns, 
as large jumps may still be recorded. Also, a problem arises with the calculation of realized 
volatility in less liquid markets, as the definition of realized volatility (sum of intraday 
squared returns) implies that returns are estimated for all intraday intervals. We alleviate this 
problem as follows. First, we drop returns whose absolute value is greater than three standard 
deviations from their mean per ticker. This allows us to retain 99 percent of the estimated 
returns. Returns are averaged for each ticker at an intraday level. Second, we use the absolute 
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value of intraday 5-minute returns as a measure of intraday volatility. For the comparison 
tables, we use the standard deviation of the absolute intraday returns. For the trading activity 
variables, we calculate the number of transactions per day, trade volume per day and the 
average daily trade size.  
We report results based on the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. Comparisons across 
periods 1 and 2, and 3 and 4 are based on contracts that are priced below €0.20 and €0.50, 
respectively. This allows us to keep the price level constant. The procedure is as follows. 
First, we classify all contracts to baskets according to their contract type (call/put) and 
moneyness (DOTM, OTM, ITM). All variables are calculated per asset and sub-period. We 
then perform the t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test on the differences in the cross-sectional 
variation in the ticker-specific variables for the differences between sub-periods one and two, 
and separately for sub-periods three and four. The reported estimates are based on equally-
weighted averages across tickers for each sub-period.  
We decide to estimate the effect of tick size changes on liquidity by employing a difference-
in-difference (DiD) model that will allow us to control for the contemporaneous effects with 
a set of contracts that are trading at the same time when the changes took place.
7
 The DiD 
model is summarized below.  
 
Liqit = α + βTreatmentt + γPostt + δTreatt∙Postt + εVit + zit                                               (7) 
 
                                                          
7
 In a similar context, Marsh and Payne (2012) use a DiD approach to investigate the effect of short sale 
restrictions on market quality indicators 
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 Liq is the liquidity variable of interest (quoted spread, effective spread, depth, price 
impact, realized spread) 
 Treatment is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for options that are affected 
by the implementation of the PBTS. This implies that in the first set of regressions 
(for calls and puts and in moneyness levels), Treatment equals 1 for options priced 
equal to or below 0.20. In the second set of regressions, we use options priced 
between 0.20 and 0.50. 
 Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the dates after the 
implementation of the PBTS. For the first set of regressions, Post takes the value of 1 
for all dates from 2 June 2009 until 30 October 2010 (Subsample 2). The base period 
for the first set of regressions is January 3, 2009 to June 1, 2009 (Subsample 1).  In 
the second set of regressions, Post takes the value of 1 for all dates from April 1, 2010 
until August 29, 2010 (Subsample 4). The base period refers to dates from November 
2, 2009 to March 31, 2010 (Subsample 3). 
 V is a vector of control variables for the options and the underlying market. The 
variables of interest are 1/Price (Pr), return volatility (Vol) and the natural logarithm 
of trading volume (TrV) for the options market. Volume is excluded when depth is 
the dependent variable. We anticipate that liquidity will be positively related to the 
reciprocal of price and to volatility and negatively related to volume (see Chung et al., 
2004, Harris, 1994). For the underlying market, we include the natural logarithm of 
the market capitalization of the underlying asset (MV), underlying volatility (Vol) and 
the closing percentage bid-ask spread (PBAS). We use the range estimator as a 
measure of the underlying market volatility (see Petrella, 2006). We expect higher 
liquidity for the larger assets. Also, we expect liquidity to deteriorate with increasing 
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levels of PBAS and with decreasing levels of underlying volatility (see Wei and 
Zheng, 2010).  
The DiD allows us to extract the following information: 
 α picks up the level of liquidity of options that are not affected by the PBTS rule 
before the implementation of the PBTS rule  
 β picks up the level of liquidity of options that are affected by the PBTS rule before 
the implementation of the PBTS rule  
 γ picks up the change in the liquidity of options that are not affected by the PBTS rule 
after the implementation of the PBTS rule 
 δ picks up the change in the liquidity of options priced below the price threshold after 
the implementation of the PBTS rule 
In order to estimate Equation (7), the control group includes all options that are priced under 
€1.00 but greater than €0.50. This allows us to maintain the price level relatively constant.  
We estimate Equation (7) separately for calls and puts and also for each moneyness level. All 
regressions are reported with double-clustered robust standard errors that allow for 
dependence across time and also across stocks (see Marsh and Payne, 2012).  
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5. ANALYSIS 
Table 1 presents the effect of the implementation of the PBTS on the liquidity measures, 
separately for calls and puts and also across moneyness levels. In line with Hypothesis 1, in 
the first stage of the PBTS, quoted spreads for contracts priced under €0.20 declined 
significantly. The average quoted spread for the DOTM call contracts pre-PBTS was 61.6% 
and the average quoted spread post-PBTS is 40.6%, a drop of 34%. Also, spreads for OTM 
calls dropped by 49% and those for ITM dropped by 55%. The drop in quoted spread is 
significant for all moneyness levels and for both calls and puts.  In the second stage of the 
PBTS, the drop in spreads is also significant for the DOTM, OTM and ITM contracts, 
nevertheless the magnitude of the change is smaller as the price level effect is stronger.  
 
***insert Table 1 around here*** 
 
Quoted depth has also dropped substantially across moneyness levels and for both puts and 
calls, a finding that confirms Hypothesis 2. During the first stage of PBTS, quoted spreads 
fell by 58% (61%) for DOTM calls (puts), 67% for OTM contracts and 64% (71%) for ITM 
calls (puts). On average, the increase in quoted spread liquidity is followed by a larger 
decrease in quoted depth liquidity. For the larger price threshold, the drop in depths is also 
highly significant across all moneyness levels. An important finding is that while before the 
implementation of PBTS, there were large differences in the number of quoted contracts 
across moneyness levels, after the introduction of the PBTS the number of contracts remains 
relatively constant across moneyness (378 contracts to 413 for contracts priced below €0.20 
and 293 to 426 for contracts priced between €0.21 and €0.50). 
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Consistent with Hypothesis 3, quote and trade liquidity have increased substantially during 
both stages of the implementation of the PBTS. The reduction in Log Quote Slope ranges 
from 21.42% (13.20%) for DOTM calls (puts) to 42.85% (43.58%) for ITM calls (puts). A 
similar, albeit less pronounced, drop is documented for the 2
nd
 stage of PBTS. Effective 
spreads for the DOTM calls almost halved from 42.08% to 21.73%. For the OTM and ITM 
calls, the increase in traded liquidity is approximately 58%. For puts, the equivalent drop in 
effective spreads is 43.26% for the DOTM, 56.61% for the OTM and 57.96% for the ITM 
puts.  The above findings imply that, while quoted liquidity increased since the 1
st
 stage of 
the PBTS, effective spreads have decreased at an even greater percentage. A significant drop 
in effective spreads is also documented for the 2
nd
 stage of PBTS.  
 
***insert Figure 1 around here*** 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the evolution of quoted depth and spread in the days prior to and after 
the implementation of the PBTS rule. We report the cross-sectional average of contracts 
trading 50 days before the tick size change for calls only. Clearly, quoted spreads dropped 
significantly at the introduction of the new tick size, however during the first stage of the 
PBTS, this reduction in spreads is gradual and the new stable level was reached after 10 
calendar days. In contrast, quoted depths decreased significantly on the first day of the new 
tick size. As expected, during the 1
st
 PBTS stage, the ITM contracts are more volatile as there 
is less trading under €0.20 at any time period. During the 2nd stage of the PBTS, the decrease 
in spreads is documented in the first day of the new rule, a finding that implies that the larger 
tick size is more binding the higher the option price. 
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***insert Figure 2 around here*** 
Figure 2 reports the outcomes of the same investigation for the quote and trade liquidity 
measures. An interesting finding is that for the 1
st
 PBTS stage, trade liquidity is significantly 
reduced, however this is not the same for quote liquidity which seems to remain relatively 
constant. This finding implies that the drop in depth becomes larger as moneyness decreases.  
The same pattern is observed for the DOTM options at the 2
nd
 stage of PBTS. Overall, Figure 
2 implies that the increase in liquidity is bounded by the increase in quoted depth. We 
investigate this claim further below. 
As market depth deteriorates, a question remains regarding the extent to which larger trades 
are affected by the drop in the number of contracts offered at the best bid and ask. We 
attempt to answer this question in Figure 3. Here, we are mostly concerned with the out-of-
the-money contracts, as these are the contracts for which the order book is thinner.
8
 We plot 
the cross-sectional quoted depth from Figure 1 against the time series of the average trade 
size in the days surrounding the tick size change for the thresholds of €0.20 and €0.50. In 
addition, we also plot two time series for the expected deviation from the average trade size 
per day: the first is calculated as the sum of the average trade size plus one standard deviation 
of that average for the particular day, and the second is the sum of the average trade size plus 
two standard deviations. We expect that on average 68% of trades will be within one standard 
deviation from the average trade size, and 95% of trades within two standard deviations from 
the average trade size. In the first two plots of Figure 3 we present the results for the DOTM 
and OTM calls priced under the price threshold of €0.20. The last two plots refer to the 
DOTM and OTM calls that are affected by the second stage of the PBTS. 
 
                                                          
8
 The results are similar for the ITM contracts. 
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***insert Figure 3 around here*** 
 
Before the tick size changes, the mean trade size was substantially lower than the average 
quoted depth which suggests that there was plenty of liquidity at the best bid and ask to 
accommodate larger trades. This finding holds for both price groups and across moneyness 
levels. However, after the implementation of the new tick size, depth at the best quotes 
decreased significantly whereas the average trade size remained unchanged. While the market 
is still able to accommodate the average trades, it becomes clear that trading at the best bid 
and ask is no longer possible for the larger trades. When the Mean + SD or the Mean + 2SD 
lines lie above the Quoted Depth line, trades of that magnitude would have to go further 
down in the order book, implying an overall decrease for the larger trades. It then becomes 
clear that the ability of the market to absorb larger trades has diminished after the change in 
the tick size. However, as 60% of trades are conducted by retail traders, we expect that this 
decrease in liquidity has no effect for the vast majority of traders in the market.  
 
***insert Table 2 around here*** 
 
Table 2 investigates the components of the effective half spread in order to decompose the 
reduction in spreads to price impact costs and the realized spread. As hypothesized, both 
price impact and realized spreads fell after the implementation of the PBTS, however this 
drop is not uniformly significant. In the 1
st
 stage of PBTS, the reduction in price impact is 
approximately 53% for the DOTM contracts and 63% for the OTM contracts. The drop in 
realized spreads is relatively higher for the same group of contracts, which implies that the 
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reduction in trade costs documented in Table 1 is driven more by the drop in real costs in that 
market. As a matter of fact, the large drop in realized spreads for the DOTM and OTM 
contracts potentially indicates a drop in market making revenues as market makers are 
obliged to offer liquidity at the deep end of the options market. At the 2
nd
 stage of PBTS, the 
drop in realized spreads is relatively smaller than the drop in price impact, implying that the 
increase in trade liquidity spreads is due to a decrease in price impact rather than a decrease 
in real costs. 
Table 3 documents the effect of PBTS on trading activity variables. We anticipate that 
following the tick size changes, contracts under the price threshold will exhibit an increase in 
transaction frequency and traded volume. 
 
***insert Table 3 around here*** 
 
As hypothesized, the overall trading volume has significantly increased following the 
implementation of the 1
st
 stage of PBTS. The increase in volume is 50% (132%) for DOTM 
calls (puts), 220% (277%) for OTM calls (puts) and 128% (100%) for ITM calls (puts). At 
the second stage of PBTS, DOTM calls and puts have recorded a greater increase in trading 
volume than the equivalent DOTM contracts at the first stage of PBTS, and the reverse is true 
for the OTM contracts.  
Also, on average, trading activity for DOTM puts has increased more than trading activity for 
DOTM calls. The increase in the DOTM options implies that investors take more risk as 
options become relatively cheaper. The increase in the DOTM puts also coincides with the 
fact that the market has been declining during the sample period (June 2, 2009 to October 30, 
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2009), hence an increase in the speculative activity for the long DOTM put investors. For the 
short DOTM put investors, while this may seem initially as a risky strategy, the short put risk 
is lower for the lower priced contracts. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, transaction frequency also increased after the change in the 
tick size. At stage 1, the average number of trades per day increased by 18% for DOTM calls 
and 125% for DOTM puts, a finding that reflects the respective liquidity increase in DOTM 
calls and puts. Clearly, the OTM contracts benefited more in terms of the overall increase in 
trading activity as the number of trades increased by 172% for calls and 217% for puts. As 
the price level increased from €0.20 to €0.50, trades for the DOTM calls (puts) increased by 
40% (48%). This finding implies that while for DOTM calls, the increase in trades is aligned 
with the increase in trading volume, for DOTM puts traded volume has increased more than 
transaction frequency, reflecting an overall increase in the average trade size. ITM calls have 
not recorded an increase in transaction frequency. 
We also hypothesize that spreads will be reduced more for assets that are more heavily traded 
as it is more likely that the large tick size on these costs acts as a binding constraint for a 
reduction in spreads. In Table 4 we show evidence in favour of this hypothesis. We classify 
tickers according to their transaction frequency in subsamples 1 and 3. We then assign 
subsamples 2 and 4 to quartiles according to their trade frequency and estimate effective half 
spreads. 
 
***insert Table 4 around here*** 
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For the 1
st
 stage of PBTS, Table 4 shows that tickers with the fewest number of trades are 
those that exhibit the smaller decrease in spreads. For the DOTM and OTM calls and puts, 
spreads narrow by more where the number of trades is greater. For ITM contracts, the 
reduction in effective spreads is at maximum levels in the medium category. For the second 
stage of PBTS, the decrease in the minimum tick size had no effect on the liquidity of the 
low-frequency options. For the tickers with medium and high trade frequency we observe a 
reduction in spreads that increases as transaction frequency increases, confirming Hypothesis 
6. 
Hypothesis 7 predicts that the effect of the PBTS in trade and quote liquidity will become less 
pronounced as moneyness increases, however Table 1 shows some primary evidence against 
this hypothesis. In particular, across all four liquidity measures liquidity appears to increase 
more as moneyness increases. However, as we will show later, this initial result is not 
supported when we control for other changes in the DiD regressions. 
We also hypothesize that quote liquidity for the OTM options written on more volatile 
underlying assets will increase by more compared to equally OTM options written on less 
volatile underlying assets, due to an increased interest on the former contracts (Hypothesis 8). 
The opposite effect is expected for the ITM contracts, as volatility will increase the 
probability of these options moving away from being ITM at expiration. Table 5 shows 
evidence in support of this hypothesis. For each stage, we use the period before the 
implementation of the tick size changes to classify tickers based on the underlying’s 
volatility. We then split the sample to low, medium and high volatility tickers and estimate 
the log quote slope before and after the tick size changes. As hypothesized, for the OTM and 
DOTM contracts and across both subsamples, quote liquidity increases more for the higher 
volatility contracts. This finding is consistent with the findings in Table 4. Also in line with 
the intuition behind Hypothesis 8, for the ITM contracts, quote liquidity increases less as the 
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underlying volatility increases. Interpreting the findings of Table 5 from the perspective of 
trading costs, the tick size constrains the speculative activities of investors in OTM contracts 
which have higher underlying asset volatility. The contracts that are more likely to increase in 
moneyness benefit more from the decreased tick size. 
 
***insert Table 5 around here*** 
 
Contracts that are affected by the changes in the tick size are also expected to exhibit lower 
volatility if liquidity has overall increased. In Table 3, volatility refers to the standard 
deviation of absolute returns. For calls, Hypothesis 9 is confirmed. For contracts trading 
under €0.20, volatility decreased and the decrease is larger for greater moneyness levels. The 
same finding is reported for puts. For the higher priced contracts, volatility also decreased 
however the decrease in volatility is relatively constant across moneyness levels.  
Regarding the third component of liquidity, execution speed, an important feature of the 
smaller tick size is that quote revisions may increase, potentially hurting the larger investors 
and in general constraining traders from posting quotes on the order book. Inevitably, the 
above would have a negative effect on the depth of the order book. Figure 3 presents the 
percentage of quote improvements before and after the implementation of PBTS. The 
procedure is as follows. The dataset is not sampled every five minutes, but instead we use the 
entire time series at the best bid and ask. For each sub-ticker, we classify a new best bid or 
best ask as a price improvement when the new ask is smaller than the previous ask or the new 
bid is greater than the old bid.
9
 We follow this procedure separately for calls and puts and 
                                                          
9
 The procedure is conducted in tick time and not in clock time as there are several new quotes per second. 
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across moneyness levels. We subsequently calculate the percentage of quote improvements 
per subticker, per day. The results are presented in Figure 4 and also in Table 6.  
 
***insert Figure 4 around here*** 
 
Figure 4 plots the percentage of price improvement for the periods before and after the 
implementation of the two stages of PBTS. For the DOTM contracts, price improvement is 
relatively similar for both price levels. The tick size reduction had a clear and substantial 
effect on the percentage of price improvement for the best bid and ask prices. This finding is 
confirmed for all moneyness contracts, however the jump in the percentage of price 
improvement becomes less visible as moneyness increases. We quantify these results in 
Table 6.  
For contracts priced below €0.20, quote improvements increased by 273% (263%) for calls 
(puts) for the DOTM contracts. That figure is reduced as moneyness increases, hence for the 
ITM contracts the increase in price improvements is on average 48% for calls and 2.5% for 
puts. For the second price group (€0.20 - €0.50), similar figures for the percentage of price 
improvement are reported for the DOTM contracts, however we also show that price 
improvements remain over 100% across moneyness levels for the whole subsample. This 
finding is an outcome of the price level effect, as traders have more opportunities to step 
ahead of higher priced contracts.  Overall, our findings show strong support for Hypothesis 
10 that the decrease in tick size has potentially led to a deterioration in the order book, as it 
allows traders to take advantage of the price priority rule and potentially step ahead of larger 
trades. 
29 
 
 
***insert Table 6 around here*** 
 
In this final part of the analysis, we use the DiD regressions to quantity the differences in 
liquidity for tickers affected by the PBTS and also controlling for the changes in liquidity for 
contracts that are not affected by the PBTS. We also control for the price level, volatility and 
trading volume for the options market. In these regressions, we use the absolute value of 5-
minute intraday returns as a high frequency measure of volatility. For the underlying market, 
we include the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the underlying asset, 
underlying volatility and the closing percentage bid-ask spread. The main variables of interest 
are Treatment, that shows the level of liquidity of options that are affected by the PBTS rule 
before the implementation of the PBTS rule, and Treat*Post that shows the change in the 
liquidity of options priced below the price threshold after the implementation of the PBTS 
rule. 
The results for quoted spread and depth are presented in Table 7. Due to space 
considerations, we only present the results for calls. The results for puts are similar and 
available upon request. 
 
***insert Table 7 around here*** 
 
For both price groups, as also confirmed in Table 1, quoted spreads generally narrowed 
following the tick size reduction. However, in contrast to Table 1, when controlling for the 
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price level, volatility and volume, quoted spreads generally decreased more for lower 
moneyness levels. This result generally confirms Hypothesis 7 that spreads for the OTM 
options reduced more than spreads for the ITM options. As anticipated, liquidity is positively 
related to price level and volatility. Also, the coefficient for volume is negative and highly 
significant for five out of six regressions. Quoted spreads are smaller for larger firms and 
increase as the underlying spread increases. The underlying asset volatility has a negative 
effect on the lower-priced options but no significance is found for the higher-priced contracts. 
Table 7 also presents the DiD regression results for the quoted depth. The treat*post variable 
indicates that depth decreases more as moneyness increases. The findings suggest that, while 
quoted spread liquidity generally increased more for the DOTM contracts, quoted depth 
liquidity deteriorated more for contracts that are further in-the-money. This implies that 
following the tick size changes, liquidity generally increased for the out-of-the-money 
contracts but decreased for the in-the-money contracts, or at least that the contracts that are 
further out-of-the-money have benefited more from the decrease in the tick size.  
 
***insert Table 8 around here*** 
 
We present the DiD regression results for the quote and trade liquidity measures in Table 8. 
Effective half spreads are generally smaller than quoted spreads, a finding that holds across 
all price groups. Also, the change in trade liquidity is smaller for the effective half spreads 
than the quoted spreads. The average quoted spread change is 31% for the DOTM contracts 
priced below €0.20 but 24% for the effective half spread. A similar relationship holds for the 
2
nd
 stage of PBTS. Also, the Post variable remains insignificant for the second stage of the 
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PBTS, suggesting that spreads for the control group have remained constant across the two 
subperiods. Spreads decrease for higher moneyness levels, a finding that further confirms 
Hypothesis 7. For the quote liquidity measure, the Treat*Post variable is generally negative 
and highly significant, implying an increase in quote liquidity after the introduction of PBTS. 
The findings of Table 8 clearly indicate that PBTS had an overall positive effect on trade and 
quote liquidity. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
On June 2, 2009 NYSE LIFFE introduced the PBTS rule on all single stock options trading at 
NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam, which allowed equity options trading at a premium of €0.20 or 
lower to be quoted at a tick size of €0.01, whereas options trading at prices higher than the 
threshold continued to be quoted at a minimum tick of €0.05. On April 1, 2010, NYSE LIFFE 
further increased the price threshold from €0.20 to €0.50. This paper presents evidence of the 
effect of the implementation of the PBTS on the liquidity of individual equity options. In this 
respect, this study is uniquely positioned in the options context where moneyness is a clear 
additional factor in the implementation of the tick size changes. 
Empirically, in equity and futures markets, several studies have shown that spreads generally 
decrease following the reduction in tick size. However, market depth deteriorates as a smaller 
tick size makes front running more profitable for smaller investors and increases order 
transparency for large traders. The latter implies an overall increase in liquidity for small 
trades and an overall decrease for institutional traders. In general, the issue is far from being 
resolved in favour of the smaller tick size and following criticisms from the industry, in June 
2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been reported to draft a pilot program 
that would increase the tick size for 100 of the smaller or less liquid US stocks. 
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Our findings suggest that, while quoted spread liquidity generally increased more for the 
deep-out-of-the-money options, quoted depth liquidity deteriorated more for contracts that 
are further ITM, implying an increase in liquidity for the out-of-the-money contracts but a 
decrease for the in-the-money contracts. Effective spreads have decreased more than quoted 
spreads for contracts with low moneyness, but the significance disappears as moneyness 
increases. For the lower-priced contracts, the drop in effective spreads is due to an overall 
decrease in real costs net of the price impact of trades, but the decrease in real costs 
disappears when the price threshold increased to €0.50. 
Importantly, we show that the ability of the market to absorb larger trades has diminished 
after the change in the tick size, which is however expected to have no effect for the vast 
majority of traders in the market as Amsterdam is dominated by retail investors. We 
document a substantial increase in quote revisions that implies that the decrease in tick size 
has potentially led to a worsening of the order book, as it allows traders to take advantage of 
the price priority rule and step ahead of larger trades. Finally, we document an increase in the 
speculative trading activity for the deep-out-of-the-money contracts which has also resulted 
to a substantial increase in option volatility. 
Our findings have important implications for optimal contract design in the equity options 
market. The goal of attracting liquidity has been achieved with two immediate implications: 
economic rents have been transferred from market makers to individual investors and the 
increase in liquidity has been realized at the expense of a thinner market for larger investors. 
The price/time priority rule may not work in circumstances when a large trade enters the 
market and, in such occasions, market makers should be allowed to increase their economic 
rents for facilitating abnormal trade sizes in ways similar to an upstairs market. A second 
possible scenario would be for the exchange to introduce a pro-rata algorithm that will 
circumvent the problem with the price priority rule when the tick size is too small. 
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Table 1 
Measures of quoted and traded liquidity 
   
  
Call Put 
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM 
Quoted Spread 
1st Stage 
Before 61.60 51.44 48.30 59.64 49.69 46.08 
After 40.60 26.28 21.36 41.64 23.73 19.42 
% diff -34.09*** -48.91*** -55.77*** -30.18*** -52.24*** -57.85*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 19.38 18.28 16.53 19.07 18.15 16.43 
After 13.89 11.23 8.77 12.27 10.34 8.67 
% diff -28.32*** -38.56*** -46.94*** -35.65*** -43.03*** -47.23*** 
Quoted depth 
1st Stage 
Before 895.81 1131.34 1144.93 995.16 1161.11 1401.83 
After 378.81 378.37 413.04 383.21 385.44 411.90 
% diff -57.71*** -66.55*** -63.92*** -61.49*** -66.8*** -70.61*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 861.63 1095.07 1352.92 908.39 1156.35 1371.55 
After 293.22 347.31 412.97 364.89 392.07 426.51 
% diff -65.96*** -68.28*** -69.47*** -59.83*** -66.09*** -68.90*** 
Log Quote Slope 
1st Stage 
Before 0.056 0.043 0.042 0.053 0.041 0.039 
After 0.044 0.028 0.024 0.046 0.025 0.022 
% diff -21.42*** -34.88*** -42.85*** -13.2*** -39.02*** -43.58*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.013 
After 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.011 0.009 
% diff -11.76*** -18.75*** -30.76*** -23.52*** -26.66*** -30.76*** 
Effective Half 
Spread 
1st Stage 
Before 42.08 35.75 32.97 39.89 34.25 30.33 
After 21.73 14.76 13.68 22.63 14.86 12.75 
% diff -48.36*** -58.71*** -58.50*** -43.26*** -56.61*** -57.96*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 16.89 15.85 13.31 16.70 15.57 12.89 
After 9.54 7.52 5.26 8.72 7.32 5.00 
% diff -43.51*** -52.55*** -60.48*** -47.78*** -52.98*** -61.21*** 
% Quoted spread is estimated as 100*(Ask5-min – Bid5-min)/Midquote5-min, where midquote refers to the average of bid and ask price. Quoted depth refers to the average 
number of contracts at the ask and bid price, estimated in 5-minute intervals. Log Quote Slope is estimated as (Ask5-min – Bid5-min)/(log(Volumeask, 5-min) + log(Volumebid, 5-
min)), % Effective spread is estimated as 200*D*(Pricet – Midquotet)/Midquotet, where D refers to a trade indicator dummy that takes the value of -1 is the trade is classified 
as a sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the 
dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before and after refer to 150-day estimation windows. For calls, we define DOTM contracts with 
moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The 
opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Realized spread and price impact  
   
  
Call Put 
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM 
Price 
Impact 
1st Stage 
Before 24.84 24.65 28.81 23.97 23.04 22.59 
After 10.51 9.11 7.10 10.15 8.47 9.08 
% diff -57.68*** -63.04*** -75.35  -57.65*** -63.23*** -59.80 
2nd Stage 
Before 10.88 11.15 9.31 11.24 11.34 9.45 
After 5.61 5.27 3.68 5.24 5.29 3.35 
% diff -48.43*** -52.73*** -60.47*** -53.38*** -53.35*** -64.55*** 
Realized 
Spread 
1st Stage 
Before 16.18 13.40 7.06 15.04 12.45 11.71 
After 6.42 3.61 2.96 6.88 3.69 1.01 
% diff -60.32*** -73.05*** -58.07** -54.25*** -70.36*** -91.37  
2nd Stage 
Before 5.41 4.12 3.72 4.78 3.89 3.38 
After 2.82 1.67 0.96 2.38 1.28 1.10 
% diff -47.87*** -59.46  -74.19  -50.20*** -67.09** -67.45  
% Realized spread is estimated as 200*D*(Pricet – Midquotet+1)/Midquotet, where D refers to a trade indicator dummy that takes the value of -1 is the trade is 
classified as a sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. % Price impact is estimated as 200*D*(Midquotet+1 – Midquotet)/Midquotet. The first stage refers to the period 
around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). 
Before and after refer to 150-day estimation windows. For calls, we define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness 
equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Table 3 
Trading activity and volatility  
   
Call Put 
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM 
Traded 
volume 
1st Stage 
Before 11365.52 3780.21 337.50 6063.52 1738.92 200.93 
After 17090.36 12100.3 770.85 14121.94 6549.01 402.69 
% diff 50.37*** 220.09*** 128.4*** 132.9*** 276.61*** 100.41*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 5716.99 15974.12 5638.36 5200.63 9628.09 2954.12 
After 10318.66 24612.85 6387.93 12627.98 17212.51 4041.42 
% diff 80.49*** 54.07*** 13.29  142.81*** 78.77*** 36.8*** 
Trades 
1st Stage 
Before 247.32 80.56 7.97 136.25 42.62 6.57 
After 292.78 219.67 17.24 307.77 135.52 10.46 
% diff 18.38** 172.67*** 116.31*** 125.88*** 217.97*** 59.20*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 164.97 465.75 144.65 142.35 303.47 97.96 
After 231.81 590.84 157.80 211.37 366.07 108.40 
% diff 40.51*** 26.85*** 9.09  48.48*** 20.62*** 10.65*** 
Volatility 
1st Stage 
Before 5.16 5.92 7.06 4.43 5.31 5.75 
After 4.57 4.42 4.20 4.35 4.14 4.15 
% diff -11.43*** -25.33*** -40.50*** -1.80** -22.03*** -27.82* 
2nd Stage 
Before 3.28 3.62 3.40 2.96 3.50 3.24 
After 2.10 2.48 2.18 1.93 2.29 2.07 
% diff -35.97*** -31.49*** -35.88*** -34.79*** -34.57*** -36.11*** 
Traded volume refers to the average volume per day, Trades refer to the total number of transactions per day and Volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
absolute value of intraday 5-minute returns. The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to 
the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before and after refer to 150-day estimation windows. For calls, we define DOTM contracts with 
moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. 
The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Traded liquidity by transaction frequency 
  
  
Call Put 
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM 
Low 
1st Stage 
Before 43.39 33.82 32.85 40.59 38.95 37.14 
After 26.10 24.38 19.31 33.44 22.50 19.06 
% diff -39.84*** -27.91*** -41.21*** -17.61** -42.23*** -48.68*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 20.36 20.39 17.96 20.31 20.62 15.34 
After 18.31 14.62 9.67 17.67 16.01 8.340 
% diff -10.06 -28.29 -46.15 -12.99* -22.35 -45.63 
Medium 
1st Stage 
Before 42.67 38.04 37.08 38.34 35.63 31.97 
After 25.60 17.95 11.20 24.02 16.60 10.48 
% diff -40.00*** -52.81*** -69.79*** -37.35*** -53.41*** -67.21*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 17.42 17.18 13.92 17.36 16.47 13.23 
After 11.64 9.52 7.49 10.80 8.87 6.89 
% diff -33.18*** -44.58*** -46.19 -37.78*** -46.14** -47.92 
High 
1st Stage 
Before 41.85 35.38 31.10 40.19 33.74 28.76 
After 20.26 13.52 12.90 21.09 14.03 13.46 
% diff -51.58*** -61.78*** -58.52*** -47.52*** -58.41*** -53.19*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 16.62 15.38 13.18 16.27 15.18 12.8 
After 8.33 6.71 4.87 7.45 6.63 4.70 
% diff -49.87*** -56.37*** -63.05*** -54.21*** -56.32*** -63.28** 
Traded liquidity refers to effective spread, estimated as 200*D*(Pricet – Midquotet)/Midquotet, where D refers to a trade indicator dummy that takes the value of -1 
is the trade is classified as a sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. Low, medium and high refer to daily transaction frequency. Low refers to the 1st quartile and 
High to the 4th quirtile. Medium refers to the 2nd and 3rd quirtile. The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the 
second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before and after refer to 150-day estimation windows. For calls, we 
define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness 
between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Quoted liquidity by underlying volatility 
 
  
  
Call Put 
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM 
Low 
1st 
Stage 
Before 0.054 0.041 0.039 0.049 0.039 0.04 
After 0.046 0.026 0.016 0.048 0.023 0.015 
% diff -14.81* -36.58*** -58.97*** -2.04  -41.02*** -62.5*** 
2nd 
Stage 
Before 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.017 0.014 0.012 
After 0.017 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.01 0.008 
% diff -10.52* -26.66*** -33.33  -23.52*** -28.57*** -33.33  
Medium 
1st 
Stage 
Before 0.062 0.049 0.037 0.062 0.046 0.034 
After 0.048 0.035 0.016 0.052 0.031 0.017 
% diff -22.58*** -28.57*** -56.75*** -16.12*** -32.6*** -50*** 
2nd 
Stage 
Before 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.02 0.019 0.018 
After 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.017 
% diff -9.52  -5.26*** -11.11  -15*** -15.78*** -5.55  
High 
1st 
Stage 
Before 0.054 0.045 0.048 0.05 0.043 0.042 
After 0.04 0.028 0.036 0.04 0.025 0.028 
% diff -25.92*** -37.77*** -25*** -20*** -41.86*** -33.33*** 
2nd 
Stage 
Before 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.013 
After 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.009 
% diff -13.33  -26.66*** -35.71*** -33.33*** -28.57*** -30.76*** 
Quoted liquidity refers to log quote slope estimated as (Ask5-min – Bid5-min)/(log(Volumeask, 5-min) + log(Volumebid, 5-min)). We use the range estimator as a measure of the 
underlying market volatility. We use the period before the implementation of the tick size changes to classify tickers based on liquidity. The first stage refers to the 
period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). 
Before and after refer to 150-day estimation windows. For calls, we define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness equal to 
0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6  
% Price improvement 
  
  
Call Put 
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM 
1st Stage 
Before 4.20 4.53 11.55 4.39 4.45 18.23 
After 15.7 15.17 17.70 15.77 16.16 17.67 
% diff 273.80*** 234.87*** 53.24* 259.22*** 263.14*** -3.07*** 
2nd Stage 
Before 5.42 6.07 5.80 5.43 6.53 6.16 
After 17.87 16.72 15.34 17.43 16.55 15.17 
% diff 229.70*** 175.45*** 164.48*** 220.99*** 153.44*** 146.26*** 
For the calculation of % Price improvement we use the entire time series at the best bid and ask and for each subticker, we classify a 
new best bid or best ask as a price improvement when the new ask is smaller than the previous ask or the new bid is greater than the old 
bid.We follow this procedure separately for calls and puts and across moneyness levels. We subsequently calculate the percentage of 
quote improvements per subticker, per day.The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) 
and the second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before and after refer to 150-day 
estimation windows. For calls, we define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness equal to 
0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for 
puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
 DID Quoted Spread and Quoted Depth 
  Spread Depth 
  1st stage  2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
  DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM 
Constant 17.91*** 13.08*** 7.06*** 13.65*** 13.97*** 10.00*** -1671.26*** -2667.05*** -3345.41*** -1635.56*** -2546.86*** -3381.62*** 
  (23.46) (35.82) (15.91) (23.22) (43.27) (34.44) (-16.89) (-36.24) (-41.82) (-23.10) (-38.54) (-39.35) 
Treatment 27.77*** 23.69*** 12.42*** 3.65*** 3.64*** 3.10*** 201.20*** 281.39*** -539.19*** 238.37*** 233.34*** 108.97*** 
  (104.73) (72.25) (10.70) (36.16) (60.76) (44.34) (16.19) (14.70) (-5.96) (15.67) (21.04) (5.61) 
Post -1.33*** -0.56*** -0.79*** 1.78*** 0.89*** 0.22*** 19.64  -8.00 69.50*** -109.66*** -75.40*** 161.22*** 
  (-11.38) (-8.11) (-11.42) (20.94) (19.38) (4.28) (0.64) (-0.34) (3.01) (-4.54) (-3.46) (5.01) 
Treat*Post -30.95*** -28.04*** -24.91*** -10.04*** -10.03*** -9.08*** -553.83*** -878.09*** -1006.17*** -613.57*** -751.72*** -1004.59*** 
  (-120.45) (-96.68) (-20.79) (-64.57) (-114.74) (-100.78) (-23.00) (-32.63) (-10.99) (-27.48) (-39.93) (-29.48) 
Volatility 0.38*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.47*** 0.31*** 0.33*** -32.18*** -25.08*** -20.69*** -24.6*** -35.15*** -46.21*** 
  (26.36) (29.99) (29.58) (23.42) (46.00) (49.89) (-23.23) (-27.12) (-17.29) (-22.54) (-33.22) (-24.88) 
1/Pr 2.82*** 2.48*** 4.22*** 4.13*** 3.75*** 3.16*** 1.24*** 3.15*** 226.28*** 74.63*** 94.37*** 241.21*** 
  (97.82) (65.24) (22.37) (95.79) (124.41) (70.13) (2.86) (3.95) (15.89) (20.64) (24.54) (25.14) 
Volume 0.90*** 1.92*** 1.89*** -0.98*** 0.16*** 0.96***  .  . .  .  .   . 
  (8.79) (40.27) (41.63) (-7.45) (3.60) (22.04)  .  . .   . .   . 
Under MV -1.71*** -1.99*** -1.69*** -0.47*** -1.21*** -1.33*** 248.16*** 380.91*** 441.76*** 229.32*** 338.65*** 456.81*** 
  (-20.63) (-46.14) (-49.78) (-5.31) (-30.42) (-36.97) (26.21) (55.62) (60.63) (31.71) (52.04) (54.55) 
PBAS 1.92*** 1.65*** 1.20*** 4.15*** 4.02*** 3.90*** -13.40*** 13.43*** 18.65*** 22.62*** 206.32*** -60.84*** 
  (2.70) (4.59) (4.36) (4.48) (8.11) (9.63) (-0.14) (0.19) (0.29) (0.26) (2.90) (-0.73) 
Under Volt -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.16*** 0.07  0.01  < 0.01 64.68*** 78.16*** 73.99*** 57.56*** 97.85*** 85.37*** 
  (-7.37) (-13.18) (-12.07) (1.63) (0.61) (0.05) (11.30) (16.15) (14.71) (8.15) (14.16) (10.26) 
R2 0.74 0.75 0.46 0.36 0.45 0.41 0.27 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.45 
Spread refers to quoted spread and depth refers to quoted depth. Treatment is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for options that are affected by the implementation of the PBTS. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the dates after the 
implementation of the PBTS. Volatility is estimated as the absolute value of intraday 5-minute returns. Pr refers to option price, Volume is the natural logarithm of trading volume per interval, Under MV refers to the natural logarithm of market capitalization of the 
underlying asset, PBAS refers to the underlying percentage bid-ask spread and Under Volt refers to the underlying volatility estimated used the range estimator.  The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the 
second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before and after refer to 150-day estimation windows. For calls, we define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness equal to 0.9 
but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
 DID Traded and Quoted Liquidity 
  Effective Half Spread Log Quote Slope 
  1st stage  2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
  DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM 
Constant 17.31*** 14.90*** 5.23*** 14.71*** 14.09*** 5.47*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
  (16.94) (17.47) (8.85) (11.12) (19.94) (14.83) (31.27) (54.59) (31.10) (22.64) (50.88) (49.92) 
Treatment 23.36*** 20.35*** 10.53*** 3.89*** 3.75*** 2.91*** 2.10E-2*** 1.60E-2*** 9.00E-2*** 2.00E-2*** 2.00E-2*** 2.00E-2*** 
  (56.63) (43.81) (6.39) (9.39) (18.48) (20.08) (53.26) (40.81) (6.76) (14.43) (30.09) (29.49) 
Post -1.32*** -0.60*** -0.01  -0.09  -0.07  0.01  -2.00E-2*** < 0.001*** -1.00E-2*** 3.00E-2*** 1.00E-2*** < 0.001*** 
  (-5.17) (-3.29) (-0.35) (-0.25) (-0.47) (0.30) (-8.31) (-2.96) (-8.73) (15.09) (15.03) (3.56) 
Treat*Post -23.90*** -22.37*** -17.02*** -8.01*** -8.53*** -8.39*** -2.20E-2*** -2.00E-2*** -1.70E-2*** -5.00E-2*** -6.00E-2*** -6.00E-2*** 
  (-57.69) (-45.58) (-12.40) (-18.18) (-40.97) (-66.45) (-53.00) (-57.60) (-10.63) (-29.34) (-56.41) (-77.59) 
Volatility 0.22*** 0.16*** -0.01  0.40*** 0.35*** 0.05*** 1.00E-2*** < 0.001*** < 0.001*** 1.00E-2*** < 0.001*** 0.00E2*** 
  (4.77) (4.88) (-1.39) (5.80) (9.28) (4.39) (29.12) (23.73) (21.67) (17.02) (33.65) (36.31) 
1/Pr 1.23*** 1.12*** 2.69*** 2.34*** 2.33*** 2.40*** 3.00E-2*** 2.00E-2*** 4.00E-2*** 4.00E-2*** 3.00E-2*** 2.00E-2*** 
  (30.12) (25.20) (8.35) (13.91) (23.33) (22.57) (77.24) (48.44) (17.83) (58.77) (89.38) (57.65) 
Under MV -0.76*** -0.65*** -0.22*** -0.77*** -0.87*** -0.24*** -4.00E-2*** -2.00E-2*** -1.00E-2*** -2.00E-2*** -2.00E-2*** -2.00E-2*** 
  (-7.74) (-9.18) (-7.79) (-6.84) (-14.58) (-8.76) (-31.30) (-48.83) (-47.90) (-23.51) (-50.51) (-45.53) 
Volume -0.59*** -0.38*** 0.01  -0.46*** -0.14*** 0.09*** . . . . . . 
  (-8.03) (-7.35) (0.77) (-5.60) (-3.70) (3.26) . . . . . . 
PBAS 0.53  1.38  -0.34  1.55  1.07  0.42  5.00E-2*** 3.00E-2*** 2.00E-2*** 7.00E-2*** 6.00E-2*** 5.00E-2 
  (0.55) (1.39) (-0.95) (0.93) (1.12) (1.25) (3.63) (5.72) (5.89) (4.22) (8.15) (10.21) 
Under Volt -0.21*** -0.19*** 0.02** -0.23*** -0.25*** 0.02* -1.00E-2*** < 0.001*** < 0.001*** < 0.001*** < 0.001*** < 0.001*** 
  (-6.74) (-4.90) (2.46) (-3.10) (-5.90) (1.67) (-11.11) (-10.37) (-9.74) (-3.44) (-4.17) (1.18) 
R2 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.04 0.04 0.39 0.62 0.65 0.46 0.23 0.37 0.42 
Traded liquidity refers to effective spread, estimated as 200*D*(Pricet – Midquotet)/Midquotet, where D refers to a trade indicator dummy that takes the value of -1 is the trade is classified as a sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. Quoted liquidity refers to log 
quote slope estimated as (Ask5-min – Bid5-min)/(log(Volumeask, 5-min) + log(Volumebid, 5-min)). Treatment is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for options that are affected by the implementation of the PBTS. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for the dates after the implementation of the PBTS. Volatility is estimated as the absolute value of intraday 5-minute returns. Pr refers to option price, Volume is the natural logarithm of trading volume per interval, Under MV refers to the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization of the underlying asset, PBAS refers to the underlying percentage bid-ask spread and Under Volt refers to the underlying volatility estimated used the range estimator.  The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of 
PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before and after refer to 150-day estimation windows. For calls, we DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts 
with moneyness equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
45 
 
Figure 1 
Quoted spread and depth around the tick size change  
  
  
  
This figure plots the average quoted spread and quoted depth for contracts trading around the implementation of the PBTS. The horizontal axis refers to days to and from  the 1st and 2nd stage of PBTS. Due to space considerations, we only 
present the result for call contracts. 
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Figure 2 
Quoted and traded liquidity around the tick size change 
  
  
  
This figure plots the average effective half spread (EHS) and quoted log slope (Slope) for contracts trading around the implementation of the PBTS. The horizontal axis refers to days to and from  the 1st and 2nd stage of PBTS. Due to space 
considerations, we only present the result for call contracts. 
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Figure 3 
Average depth and trade size around the tick size change 
Price threshold: €0.20, Moneyness: Deep Out 
 
Price threshold: €0.20, Moneyness: Out 
 
Price threshold: €0.50, Moneyness: Deep Out 
 
Price threshold: €0.50, Moneyness: Out 
 
This figure plots the average trade size and quoted depth the around the implementation of the PBTS. SD refers to the standard deviation of 
the mean trade size. For the first (last) two plots, the horizontal axis refers to days to and from to June 2, 2009 (April 1, 2010) (day 0). Due 
to space considerations, we only present the result for call contracts. 
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Figure 4 
Average mean quote improvement around the tick size changes 
 
 
 
This figure plots the percentage of price improvement for the periods before and after the implementation of the two stages of PBTS. , we 
classify a new best bid or best ask as a price improvement when the new ask is smaller than the previous ask or the new bid is greater than 
the old bid. The horizontal axis refers to days to and from  the 1st and 2nd stage of PBTS. 
 
 
 
 
